Opinion: Shifting currents in India-New Zealand relationships
China’s aggressive posturing, Indo-Pacific churn and intense US-China competition are making New Zealand look towards forming more security partnerships
By Dr Akhil Kumar, Dr Anudeep Gujjeti
Fresh off their triumph over New Zealand in the recently concluded Champions Trophy 2025 in Dubai, India hosted New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon on a five-day bilateral visit. During his stay, he was also the chief guest at the Raisina Dialogue. The diplomatic ties between India and New Zealand were established by upgrading an Indian Trade Commission in New Zealand, which was opened in 1950, to a High Commission in 1952.
Historical Connect
India and New Zealand share a historical connection that dates back to the days of the British Empire, with Indians’ migration to New Zealand beginning in the 1890s. In 1926, the New Zealand Central Indian Association was established, with branches across the country, to provide the Indian diaspora with an organised voice and a platform for collective representation.
After gaining independence from the British Empire in the late 1940s, the relationship between the two nations remained notably distant. As New Zealand deepened its strategic alignment with Australia and the United States (US) through the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, there was limited resonance with India’s Nehruvian policy of non-alignment. Further, the emergence of the New Commonwealth, comprising newly decolonised nations in Asia and Africa with India playing a leading role, was perceived as a challenge by conservative leaders such as Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (1975-1984), contributing to a divergence in diplomatic priorities between the two nations.
Despite differences over India’s nuclear policies and New Zealand’s staunch anti-nuclear stance, both nations demonstrated gestures of goodwill and cooperation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1968, in a significant diplomatic gesture, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited New Zealand to strengthen bilateral ties. During her visit, India extended humanitarian assistance by sending 1,100 pounds of tea to support earthquake victims in New Zealand. In 1971, New Zealand responded generously to the refugee crisis following the Bangladesh Liberation War and further extended support by offering Royal New Zealand Air Force planes to transport relief supplies.
Given that 49 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP depends on trade, maintenance of open and free maritime lanes remains a priority for the country
Beyond humanitarian exchanges, New Zealand played a role in India’s White Revolution, which aimed to enhance milk production. In 1970, India imported 100 cows from New Zealand to support this initiative, marking an early collaboration in the dairy sector. More recently, a delegation from the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) visited New Zealand to explore further partnerships in dairy innovation and sustainability.
Post-Cold War years
By the late 1990s, New Zealand’s India policy began shifting, primarily for economic reasons. The 1997 financial crisis tempered enthusiasm for the ‘Asian Tigers,’ while India’s rapidly growing economy post-liberalisation presented new opportunities.
Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark, at the launch of the “Seriously Asia — Look at the Future” project on 29 August 2003, said, “We know that India is developing fast as an economy and knowledge society, and could overtake China as the most populous nation on earth. We know that there are problems in the Indian subcontinent too, including threats of nuclear proliferation and the realities of terrorism. But as history has shown, we also know that there are many opportunities.”
New Zealand’s policy shift aligned with India’s ‘Look East’ policy, launched in 1992 under the Narasimha Rao government. As China’s influence grew in the Asia-Pacific, India deepened its engagement with ASEAN, becoming a Sectoral Partner in 1992, a Dialogue Partner in 1995 and a Summit Partner in 2002. It also joined the Pacific Islands Forum and the East Asia Summit in 2002 and 2005, respectively. India’s strategic interests in the region spurred closer ties with Australia and New Zealand.
Meanwhile, New Zealand, focused on maritime security and freedom of navigation, took note of India’s expanding regional presence. However, economic interests remained the primary driver of their evolving relationship till recently.
Diversifying Horizons
For years, New Zealand has implemented a hedging strategy between China and the US. Although it falls under the US security framework, New Zealand has strengthened its economic relations with China. In 2008, China represented only 5.8 per cent of New Zealand’s exports, but by 2023, this increased to about 27 per cent. However, the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific has witnessed a major transformation in recent years, which led to intense strategic competition between the US and China.
In the first two decades of the 21st century, New Zealand and Australia possessed more flexibility in expanding commerce with China because of their geographical remoteness from the immediate security threat presented by Beijing. This made New Zealand initially distance itself from the Indo-Pacific construct, preferring the more familiar Asia-Pacific wording. Despite this, by 2019, New Zealand formally adopted the Indo-Pacific concept in its official discourse. This shift was further reinforced in a 2022 joint statement between then Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and US President Joe Biden, pledging to maintain “peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific.”
A fundamental aspect underlying this strategic realignment has been New Zealand’s rising concerns over China’s influence in the Pacific and its implications for regional maritime security and trade. Given that 49 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP depends on trade, the maintenance of open and free maritime lanes remains a priority for New Zealand. The recent Cook Islands plan to strike a partnership deal with China and New Zealand’s reaction to it is a case in point.
Cook Islands is not the only Pacific Island nation to strengthen relations with China. Prior to the Cook Islands, the Solomon Islands in 2022 entered into a security agreement with Beijing. Even Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea developed robust connections with China. This growing Chinese influence in the Pacific has increasingly threatened the primacy of the US and its allies in the region.
This realisation has prompted New Zealand to diversify its strategic partnerships, particularly with the Indo-Pacific nations. A crucial step has been its increased interaction with India. In their recent joint statement, New Zealand and India reiterated their mutual commitment to an “open, inclusive, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” grounded in a rules-based international order. They also reaffirmed the importance of “freedom of navigation and overflight” under the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”
Further underscoring this shift, both nations signed an MoU on defence cooperation. Additionally, New Zealand has joined the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, further aligning itself with regional frameworks that counterweight China’s ambitions. New Zealand even welcomed India joining the US-led Combined Maritime Forces.
Over the years, New Zealand and India have engaged only in occasional defence cooperation through military exercises, staff exchanges and naval port calls. However, the recent visit by Luxon brought a fillip to the defence engagement of both countries. This was possible due to systemic factors such as China’s aggressive posturing, geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and intense US-China competition, exerting pressure on New Zealand to look towards forming more security partnerships.
(Dr Akhil Kumar is a PhD from Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad and Dr Anudeep Gujjeti is Assistant Professor, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies, REVA University, Bengaluru, and Young Leader, Pacific Forum, USA)
